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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 20020031-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is information supplied by a single confidential informant sufficient on its own, 
without corroboration by the police, to provide a substantial basis for a magistrate's 
determination that there was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be 
found at Barney's residence? This Court will invalidate a search pursuant to a warrant if 
given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate lacked a "substantial basis" for 
determining that probable cause existed. State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 143, cert, denied, 
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). In reaching this decision, this Court should consider the 
affidavit in support of the warrant in its entirety. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 
(Utah 1985). This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 57-75). 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT BARNEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
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< 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE * 
A. Nature of the Case 
Robert Barney appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth 
District Court after the entry of a conditional plea to the charge of possession with intent 
to manufacture or produce a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Robert Barney was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or 
about August 18, 2000, with 1) unlawful production of marijuana, a controlled substance, 4 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(i), 2) 
possession or use of marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free zone, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 3) unlawful ( 
possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (R. 2). 
On June 20, 2001, Barney waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 50). On 
July 10, 2001, Barney filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the 
execution of a search warrant, arguing that 1) the magistrate lacked probable cause to 
i 
authorize a search, 2) the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide 
sufficient evidence to justify a search without notice of intent or authority, and 3) the 
defendant's incriminating statements and actions were not attenuated from the illegal 
2 
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search. (R. 57-75). On July 27, 2002, the court ordered the State to file an addendum to 
their response explaining "this is a very close case" since the affidavit for the search 
warrant might lack independent corroboration besides the confidential informant (R. 146 
at 3). 
On August 22, 2001, the hearing for the motion to suppress the search warrant was 
held before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham (R. 95, 147). At the hearing, the judge 
denied the motion to suppress, finding that "the affidavit does set sufficient facts in the 
affidavit to establish that this is probably a reliable confidential informant" (R. 147 at 10, 
22). 
On September 26, 2001, the case was set for Entry of Plea before the Honorable 
Guy R. Burningham (R. 98). The next day, September 27, 2001, defense entered a 
Request for Clarification of Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, arguing that the 
Court's file "does not include the Affidavit, Warrant, and Return of Service, with 
inventory" as required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-209, Utah Code (R. 100-101). 
On October 12, 2001, the court filed the Search Warrant as requested in defendant's 
Request (R. 102-103). 
On October 17, 2001, Barney entered into a no-contest "Sery Plea" to the charge 
of unlawful production of a controlled substance, a third degree felony conditioned on his 
"right to appeal in order to present his challenge to the issuance of the search warrant" 
(R. 115-125). 
On November 11, 2001, Barney was sentenced to 35 days in the Utah County Jail, 
ordered to pay a fine of $925, and was placed on probation for 36 months. (R. 130-133). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On 22 June, 2000, officer Robert Welcker, presented an affidavit in support of a < 
search warrant to the Honorable Fred D. Howard sitting as a magistrate seeking a search 
warrant to enter the premises Robert Barney (R. 74). "The Affidavit set forth in ten 
paragraphs the reasons for requesting authority to search" (R.74). < 
"The reasons set forth in the Affidavit to justify a search of the targeted residence 
come exclusively from one confidential informant" (R. 71). The sole confidential 
informant "was working off charges by working for the police and therefore was not a 
private citizen" (R. 88). The affiant (Officer Welcker) stated that the confidential 
informant had "hundreds of experiences with marijuana and knows the substance well," 
and that the informant saw the defendant sell and grow marijuana in and around the 
residence (R. 109). The confidential informant also asserted being at the residence 
"several times in the past three months when individuals arriving and leaving the 
residence in vehicles were transporting marijuana and paraphernalia and that individuals 
at the residence have marijuana and paraphernalia secreted on their persons " (R. 109). 
After receiving this information from the confidential informant, "neither officer ^ 
Welcker (the affiant) nor any other police officer provided the magistrate with additional 
evidence to support the search, such as surveillance of the residence, evidence of 
unusually high traffic, a garbage can search, a controlled buy, information from named or i 
known neighbors, etc." (R. 71). 
Thereafter, on the same date, the magistrate executed a search warrant granting a 
search of the described premises (R. 74). The search warrant authorized a search 
"during the night time hours" and "without notice of prior intent or authority" (R. 74). 
4 
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The described premises were searched by various officers from various Utah 
County police departments and the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force, with entry 
being achieved at approximately 9:00 p.m. on 23 June, 2000 (R. 74). As a result of the 
search, various items of personal property were seized (R. 74, 105-106). Barney seeks 
suppression of such tangible evidence as well as any of his statements made to police 
executing the warrant by way of his Motion to Suppress (R. 73). 
The state submitted to the defendant's recitation of the facts (R. 92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Barney's motion to suppress evidence seized 
during the execution of a search warrant of his premises. The affidavit in support of a 
search warrant contained no evidence that any officer independently corroborated the 
confidential informant's tip. The magistrate authorized a search of Barney's residence 
solely on the assertions of a confidential informant's who happened to be working off 
charges for the police and whose only qualification was having hundreds of past 
experiences with marijuana. 
Utah has adopted a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a fair 
probability exists that drugs will be obtained pursuant to a search. When the reliability of 
a confidential informant has been questioned, all relevant Utah case law has provided that 
some form of independent police corroboration was a significant factor in the 
magistrate's proper grant of a search warrant. There is no relevant Utah case law finding 
a magistrate properly granted a search warrant without independent police corroboration. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT 
The trial court's denial of Barney's motion to suppress should be reversed because 
the magistrate lacked the substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit adequately 
established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The confidential 
informant was on the low end of the reliability scale and the informant's assertions were 
not corroborated in any manner. 
For a magistrate to determine there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place, he must look at "all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge" of the informant. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The court pays great deference to a judicial
 { 
determination of probable cause. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
When an affidavit for a search warrant relies solely on a confidential informant, 
additional corroboration of the informant's assertions are essential to establish sufficient < 
probability for a magistrate to execute a search warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 
[sufficient probability based on anonymous informant and officer corroboration]; State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) [sufficient probability based on reliable informant and { 
officer's personal knowledge that suspect was involved in drug violations]; Kaysville City 
v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) [reliable citizen-
informant and corroboration by officer]; State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, 37 P.3d 
260 [officers are expected to make significant corroborative efforts to verify informant 
tips]. 
6 
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A. The Confidential Informant's Reliability 
The reliability of the informant one of the factors a magistrate is to consider when 
determining whether there is a fair probability that evidence sought actually exists. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The Utah Supreme Court has devised a three part test to 
determine the reliability of an informant's assertions. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 
231, (UtahApp. 1997) 
In Mulcahy, the court adopted "three factors to consider in determining the 
reliability and sufficiency of [an] informant's report." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. The 
first factor focuses on the type of tip or informant involved. Id. The court stated that an 
informant identified as a "citizen-informant" is high on the reliability scale. Id. 
Anonymous tips are toward the low-end of the reliability scale. Id. A police informant 
"would obviously be lower on the reliability scale than a citizen-informant" since he gains 
information through involvement in criminal activity or he is motivated by gain. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at note 2. 
The second factor is "whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed 
activity to support a stop." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. The court stated that a tip is more 
reliable if the informant observed the details personally and there is no hint of fabrication. 
Id. 
The final factor is "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Id. The court stated that "corroboration by the 
police officer means, in light of the circumstances, he confirms enough facts so that he 
may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable and a detention is 
justified." Id. 
7 
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Although the test in Mulcahy was adopted to determine an officer's reasonable 
sufficiency of information to make a stop, the test reasonably extends to a magistrate's 
determination of the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant when an affidavit and a 
magistrate's finding of probable cause is based entirely on observations made by a single 
confidential informant. In Mulcahy, the court stated that "although the necessary degree 
of suspicion is lower than that necessary for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of 
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient and 
articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion." 943 P.2d at 234. And in State v. 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, f [ 16-17, 37 P.3d 260 (Utah App. 2001), the court 
reasoned: 
The Mulcahy factors were formulated to assist in determining 
whether an officer had the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to 
justify a traffic stop, we see nothing to prohibit extending the use of these 
factors to determinations of probable cause in the context of information 
supplied by an informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234; see also Gates, 462 
U.S. at 241-46 (finding probable cause existed to arrest the defendant after 
examining the reliability of the informant, the content of the tip, and the 
. corroborative efforts of the agent); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 
313-14(1959). 
The Mulcahy factors clearly focus on examining the totality of the 
circumstances in these situations and will provide trial courts and trial 
counsel assistance when faced with similar probable cause determinations 
in the future." 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the court stated that an informant 
that had supplied the police "with information in the past that had resulted in several 
felony arrests and convictions" was a sufficient indication of the informants reliability 
and veracity. Id. at 130. But in the affidavit for the search warrant, the officer 
corroborated the informant's tips. Id. at 131. 
Because the confidential informant in the case at bar "was working off charges by 
working for the police" (R. 88), his motivation for informing was for personal gain and 
8 
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not "out of concern for the community." Malcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. Thus, his reliability 
is at the low end of the scale under the Malcahy standard. Even though Officer Welcker 
asserted in the affidavit that the informant "has provided reliable information in the past" 
(R. 110), the informant's reliability must still be corroborated independently. 
B. Corroboration by Police 
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test, the reliability of the informant is but 
one of the factors a magistrate is to consider when determining whether there is a fair 
probability that evidence sought actually exists. Even if the court finds that the magistrate 
could conclude that the confidential informant was a reliable source, Barney asserts that 
the magistrate still needed additional corroboration of the informant's assertions to 
support the determination that a fair probability existed that evidence of a crime would be 
at Barney's residence. 
"An officer's statement that affiants have received reliable information from a 
credible person and believe that [drugs are] stored in a home is likewise inadequate" to 
establish a substantial basis that evidence exists. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "Absent a risk 
to public safety, we expect police officers to make significant independent corroborative 
efforts to confirm information from a tip." State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at note 
8. "The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare conclusions of others." State v. 
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), an Illinois police department received an 
anonymous letter including statements that a husband and wife were heavily involved in 
drug trade. Id. at 225. The letter stated that the wife would drive a car to Florida to be 
loaded with drugs while the husband would fly down and drive the car back. Id. Acting 
9 
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on this information, arrangements for surveillance of the defendant's flight were made by 
the DEA. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225. The surveillance disclosed "that the husband took the 
flight, stayed overnight in a motel room registered in the wife's name, and left the 
following morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois license plate issued to the 
husband, heading north on an interstate highway used by travelers to the Bloomingdale 
area." Id. at 213. With this information, a search warrant was obtained. Id. at 226. 
The Court stated that the anonymous letter alone would not provide the basis for a 
magistrate to issue the search warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. The Court adopted a 
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly found probable 
cause to issue a search warrant. Id. at 230-231. Explaining this test, the Court stated: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place. Id. at 238. 
The Court in dicta also explained the "limits beyond which a magistrate may not 
venture when issuing a search warrant." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "An officer's 
statement that affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and
 ( 
believe that [drugs are] stored in a home is likewise inadequate." Id. The Court 
expounded on the importance of corroborating evidence when applying the totality of 
circumstances test. Id. at 241. The Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 < 
(1959), where an officer received an informant's detailed account and description of the 
suspect, which included the name, detailed description of the clothes the defendant would 
be wearing on the date of his arrival, and the defendant's travel plans, including the date 
and time of the defendant's arrival. Gates, 462 U.S. at 242. The officer went to the 
station on the appointed morning and saw the defendant who matched the exact physical 
10 
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attributes and wearing the same clothes as identified by the informant. Id. The Court in 
Draper concluded that the officer had sufficient information to justify further 
investigation. Id. 
The Court in Gates held that the magistrate could rely upon the anonymous 
informant's tip since it was corroborated by the DEA. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243. 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987), the defendants appealed their 
convictions of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. The affidavit for the 
search warrant stated that the informant had "supplied the police with information in the 
past which has resulted in several felony arrests and convictions." Id. The affidavit also 
stated that the confidential informant was at the defendant's apartment (five days previous 
to the execution of the search warrant) and "saw a large quantity of marijuana which was 
being sold in smaller quantities." Id. The affidavit further stipulated that the affiant was 
acquainted with the defendant as the defendant had previously been arrested for drug 
violations. Id. 
The trial court denied the defense's motion to suppress, and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that: 
Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a common-sense, 
reasonable manner. Excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or 
of the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this 
task. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court 
emphasized that an informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are 
but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence 
of probable cause under "a totality-of-the-circumstances." They are not 
strict, independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A 
weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the 
totality there is a substantial basis to find probable cause. The indicia of 
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexlcusive elements to be 
evaluated in reaching the practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the contraband will be 
found in the place described. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 3X130. 
11 
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The Court in Hansen found that an affidavit for a search warrant based upon 
reliable, personal information from a confidential informant and an officer's personal 
knowledge that the suspect was involved in drug violations established sufficient 
probability for a magistrate to conclude some quantity of drug would be found in a 
search./d. at 131. 
The facts and holding in State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994), add 
additional strength to the general rule that independent corroboration of an informant's 
testimony is needed. Here, a confidential informant voluntarily provided detailed 
information to the officer about the suspect. Id. at 1032. The informant received nothing 
in exchange for the information. Id. The officer verified the informant's information and 
then obtained a search warrant based on the informant's information and the officer's 
verification of that information. Id. The court held that "because the confidential 
informant here received nothing in exchange for information about Vigh's illegal 
activities, the magistrate properly assumed that the informant was reliable.... and because 
the police independently corroborated those details, the magistrate properly determined 
the confidential informant was reliable.... and the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause and issuing the search warrant." Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1034. 
The facts in State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), are similar to Vigh. 
Here, the officer received a voluntary tip from a confidential informant. Purser, 828 P.2d 
at 516. The officer personally verified the significant facts of the tip and then obtained a 
search warrant.. Id. at 518. The court concluded, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the affidavit established probable cause that drugs would be found at 
defendant's residence. Id. 
12 
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In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), a citizen called the 
police informing them a "drunk individual" had left his front door and is driving in a 
"white Toyota Celica, maybe." Id. at 233. The caller informed the police in what 
direction the defendant was headed and what road he was on. Id. The informant left his 
name and address with the police. Id. A dispatcher in turn radioed an officer; the officer 
saw the white car heading in the direction described by the informant and stopped the car 
even though the officer observed no traffic violations. Id. After smelling alcohol on the 
defendant's breath and conducting a field sobriety test, the officer arrested the defendant. 
Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to support the stop and the trial court granted the motion. Id. 
The court reversed the motion to suppress, finding that the caller, as a citizen-
informant, was high on the reliability scale, that the informant supplied sufficient detail to 
support a stop, and that the officer satisfactorily corroborated the informant's report. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238. The court stated that the officer had identified a similar make 
of the car on the same road and direction that the informant reported within a few minutes 
of the report. Id. 
In State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at 12, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office received a report from an unidentified informant of a forgery in progress at a bank. 
The informant identified the suspect as Hispanic male and identified the clothes he was 
wearing. Id. at \ 2. A deputy arrived at the bank and immediately noticed Valenzuela as 
the person described in the report. Id. A bank teller also pointed the deputy in the 
direction of Valenzuela. Id. The deputy believed Valenzuela to be the suspect and 
approached him and placed him in custody for "safety reasons." Id. at f 3. The deputy 
then searched Valenzuela and found him in possession of methamphetamine. Id. 
13 
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The court found that the officer's failed to investigate further to determine whether 
any criminal activity occurred. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at f 30. The court stated, 
"absent a risk to public safety, we expect police officers to make significant independent 
corroborative efforts to confirm information from a tip prior to detaining a suspect." Id. at 
note 8. The court reversed the conviction concluding that under the totality of the 
circumstances, there was not probable cause to detain Valenzuela because the informant 
was on the low end of the reliability scale, the informant gave little information, and the 
officer failed to investigate finding that the deputy lacked sufficient information to 
support an independent judgment of probable cause to place Valenzuela in custody. Id. 
at 131-32. 
The above cases establish that where an affidavit for a search warrant relies upon 
one single informant, additional independent corroboration other than a reliable 
informant's testimony is essential to establish sufficient probability to execute a search 
warrant. The reliability is but one of the factors a magistrate is to consider under the 
"totality of the circumstances." In the case at bar, the affidavit for the search warrant 
relied solely on a single confidential informant's testimony regarding the informant's 
personal presence at Barney's residence where marijuana was allegedly present (R. 107-
110). The affiant did not provide any additional corroboration to the informant's 
testimony (R. 71, 107-110). Thus, the magistrate made the decision to issue a search 
warrant solely on the testimony of a confidential informant who was "working of charges 
by working for the police and therefore was not a private citizen" (R. 88). Moreover, 
the only qualification possessed by the informant was his knowledge of marijuana based 
on "hundreds" of experiences with it. In all of the above cited cases, officers had to 
provide some sort of corroborating evidence before a finding of sufficient probable cause. 
14 
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See also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) [officer verified significant 
facts of informant's tip]. 
Accordingly, Barney asserts that this Court should reverse the denial of his motion 
to suppress because, given the totality of the circumstances-namely the inherent 
unreliability of the confidential informant and a lack of police corroberation-the 
magistrate lacked a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit adequately established 
probable cause of illegal activity for the issuance of a search warrant. Barney further 
asserts that any evidence obtained as a result of the warrant must be excluded as fruits of 
the poisonous tree. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Barney asks that this Court reverse the trial court's 
erroneous denial of his motion to suppress and asks that the matter be remanded to the 
Fourth District Court with instructions that his plea should be withdrawn and the 
information dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2002. 
Margaret P//Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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.o H. MEANS 
_AH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
/'Attorneys for Defendant Ql •." . ' C: F,';' 5: 07 
^ 245 North University Avenue W^ 
Provo, Utah, 84601 , . ^ 
(801)379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BARNEY, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 001403161 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
and MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF 
Hon. Guy R. Burningham 
MOTION 
COMES NOW, Defendant, ROBERT BARNEY, by and through his 
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule 12 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, who hereby moves for this 
Court's Order suppressing all evidence seized as a result of the 
execution of a search warrant on or about 23 June, 2000, at 1136 
South State Road #198, Payson, Utah. Support for this Motion is 
more particularly set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of 
points and authorities. 
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MEMORANDUM 
Defendant respectfully submits the following points and 
authorities in support of his Motion to Suppress: 
Facts Relevant to this Motion 
On 22 June, 2000, officer Robert Welker, in an action 
entitled STATE OF UTAH v NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 1136 South State 
Road #198 Payson, Utah, presented an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A 
SEARCH WARRANT to the Honorable Fred D. Howard sitting as a 
magistrate seeking a search warrant to enter the premises at that 
address, [A copy of such Affidavit is attached hereto as an 
exhibit.] The Affidavit set forth in ten (10) paragraphs the 
reasons for requesting authority to search. Thereafter, on the 
same date, the magistrate executed a SEARCH WARRANT allowing for 
a search of the described premises. The SEARCH WARRANT 
authorized a search "during the night time hours" and "without 
notice of prior intent or authority". [A copy of said SEARCH 
WARRANT is likewise attached hereto.] 
The described premises were searched by various 
officers from various Utah County police departments and the Utah 
County Major Crimes Task Force, with entry being achieved at 
approximately 9:00 p.m. on 23 June, 2000. As a result of the 
search, various items of personal property were seized. Defendant 
seeks suppression of such tangible evidence as well as any of his 
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statements made to police executing the warrant by way of his 
Motion to Suppress. 
Questions Presented 
1) Were the factual assertions set forth in the 
Affidavit sufficient for the magistrate to have independently 
concluded that there was a fair probability contraband would be 
found in the targeted Premises? 
2) Was There Legal Authority for the Search Warrant to 
authorize a search of the targeted premises without notice of 
prior intent or authority? 
3) Were Defendant's statements attenuated from the 
effects of the illegal search? 
Standard of Review 
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of 
the circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly 
found probable cause to issue a search warrant.1 In so holding 
the Court directed that "[a] magistrate's 'determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing 
courts.1"2 "fA grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts 
toward warrants,1 is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
2Gates, above, citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
3 
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'courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting 
affidavit [s] in a hyper technical, rather than a common sense, 
manner.'"3 
While the United States Supreme Court has required that an 
affidavit provide only a "substantial basis for ... concluding 
that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing", and 
that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there is 
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular placet,]" the Court also stressed that 
"[i]n order to ensure that ... an abdication of a magistrate's 
duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously 
review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are 
issued." 4 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was made applicable 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized this review-of-warrants test articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court.6 
Gates, above, citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
4 
Gates, above. 
5Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
6State v^_ Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983); State L . Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1985); State v^_ Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (1989); State v^ Thurman, 846-
P.2d 1256. 
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Argument 
As a preface to substantive argument, Defendant asserts that 
the evidence seized as a result of execution of the above-noted 
Search Warrant should be suppressed unless the original 
Affidavit, Search Warrant, and Return of Service are made a part 
of this file. 
1. The affidavit did not sufficiently establish the credibility 
of the single confidential informant. 
In this case the reasons set forth in the Affidavit to 
justify a search of the targeted residence come exclusively from 
one confidential informant. "Neither officer Welker (the affiant) 
nor any other police officer provided the magistrate with 
additional evidence to support a search, such as surveillance of 
the residence, evidence of unusually high traffic, a garbage can 
search, a controlled buy, information from named or known 
neighbors, etc. Consequently, the information in the Affidavit is 
only as good as the credibility of the informant. 
Defendant is aware that in Gates7 the United State Supreme 
Court specifically retreated from the hyper-technical two-pronged 
Aguilar/Spenelli8 test in favor of the "totality of the 
circumstances" test for assessing the reliability of information 
supplied by informants used in support of requests for search 
Supra. 
8 A g u i l a r v T e x a s , 378 U . S . 108 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; S p i n e l l i v^ U n i t e d S t a t e s , 393 U .S . 4 
( 1 9 6 9 ) . 
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warrants. However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor 
the appellate courts of Utah have held that the reliability and 
accuracy of confidential informants is unimportant, nor have any 
of these courts abandoned inquiry into the credibility of 
confidential informants. 
First, the Gates court, itself, indicated that the 
totality of'the circumstances test "includ[es] the 'veracity1 and 
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, 
...."
9
 Also, our Utah Supreme Court, in cases decided after Gates 
and the several Utah cases which specifically recognized and 
adopted the Gates test10, has held: 
"even under [the Gates! standard, compliance with 
the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines may be necessary to 
make a sufficient basis for probable cause. Depending 
on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of 
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person 
providing the information for a warrant may well be 
necessary to establish with a 'fair probability' that 
the evidence sought actually exists and can be found 
where the informant states. In other cases, however, a 
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's 
knowledge, veracity, and reliability may be required, 
if the circumstances as a whole indicate that the 
informant's report is truthful"11 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[the Aquilar-
Spinelli guidelines] are useful even under the totality of 
o 
Gates, supra. 
See footnote 6, above. 
1]State v Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah, 1984); accord State v Anderson, 701 
P.2d 1099 (Utah, 1985). 
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circumstances test for determining whether the facts establish 
probable cause."12 
From these federal and state cases dealing with informants • 
it is clear that in situations such as the case at bar, where no 
other evidence bolsters or corroborates the informant, the 
credibility and basis of knowledge of the informant is extremely 
critical to an assessment of the sufficiency of the affidavit. 
When viewed in this light, the Affidavit here fails in its 
attempt to establish the credibility of the sole informant. 
At first blush, from the Affidavit, it would appear that the 
informant had considerable knowledge of happenings within the 
targeted residence. The informant claimed to have been "at" the 
residence within 72 hours of presentment of the Affidavit, he 
observed marijuana there, he knows marijuana was in the house as 
well as a shed near the house, he knows that Defendant and 
Annette Petro were distributing marijuana from the residence, he 
observed Defendant sell H ounce of marijuana for approximately 
$120.00, Defendant told him he was growing marijuana, and he 
knows that Defendant and Annette Petro live at the residence 
[Affidavit, paragraph #3]. The informant further claims to have 
been "inside" the residence within 30 days of presentment of the 
Affidavit and that Defendant told him he was growing marijuana in 
12State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. Ct. App., 1990); see also Salt Lake City v 
Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993), State v Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017 
(Ut. Ct. App., 1993), State v Lee, 863 P.2d 49 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993). 
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the house and in a barn to the rear of the house, that Defendant 
also told him he grows "a lot" of marijuana and usually gets 
$60.00 per 1/8 ounce, he observed wet and fresh marihuana, and 
Defendant tried to sell him some marijuana [Affidavit, paragraph 
#4]. Additionally, the informant claims to have been at the 
residence ''several times in the past three months" and observed 
individuals arriving there carrying marijuana and paraphernalia 
"secreted on their persons" [Affidavit, paragraph #5]. Lastly, 
the informant told Officer Welker that the "subjects" living in a 
trailer next to the residence "are party to the subjects living 
in the residence" [Affidavit, paragraph #6]. 
From this wealth of "inside" information provided by the 
informant one might assume that the informant has a solid basis 
of knowledge for the information he provided to Officer Welker. 
But this assumption is valid only if one can also be assured that 
the informant is truthful in his assertions; after all, such 
assertions should be taken as true and accurate only if the 
informant is established as truthful and accurate. 
As evidence of the informant's credibility, Officer Welker 
swore to the magistrate that the informant "has supplied officers 
of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force with information for 
the past year", "that this informant has been responsible for the 
recovery of narcotics in several cases", that the information 
from this informant "has always proven true through independent 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
investigations by myself and other detectives of the Major Crimes 
Task Force", "that this informant has provided information which 
has proven to be reliable in the past", "that this informant has 
never provided information that has been wrong or misleading", 
and "that this informant is not a party to this investigation" 
[Affidavit, paragraph #2], "that this informant has provided 
information which has proven reliable in the past", "that this 
informant has never provided information that has been wrong or 
misleading", and "that this informant is not a party to this 
investigation [Affidavit, paragraph #8]. 
Most of this vouching for the credibility of the informant 
is stock language that appears in most (if not all) of the 
Affidavits prepared by the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force 
and other police agencies in Utah County. None of these 
statements give a magistrate any facts from which the magistrate 
can, independently, determine, for himself or herself, that the 
informant is reliable. All of the statements are conclusory 
rather than factual. They do not set forth information to be 
weighed by the magistrate; rather, they are unsupported 
testimonials. Without specific facts, the magistrate is left only 
to defer to the opinion and conclusions of the affiant. By 
accepting such assertions as evidence of reliability the 
magistrate abandoned neutrality and impermissibly "rubber-
9 
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stamped" the affiant's conclusions. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in State v Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah, 1989), 
"[t]he fourth amendment requires that when a 
search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, 
that affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient 
to support a determination by a neutral magistrate that 
probable cause exists (emphasis added)(citing to State 
v Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,190 (Utah, 1986)). The affiant 
must articulate particularized facts and circumstances 
leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists. 
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice (citing to 
Gates, supra)".13 
It might be argued that the following facts provided by 
Officer Welker substantiated the informant's credibility: "that 
the informant has had hundreds of experiences with marijuana and 
knows the substance well", that the informant had claimed to have 
observed the occupants of the residence distributing marijuana, 
specifically a sale of H ounce for $120.00, that Defendant 
admitted to the informant that he (Defendant) was growing 
marijuana on the premises [Affidavit, paragraph #3], that 
Defendant told the informant his "usual" price per 1/8 ounce, 
that the informant observed "very wet and fresh" marijuana in the 
premises, that the Defendant attempted to sell marijuana to the 
informant [Affidavit, paragraph #4], that the informant was at 
the house "several times in the past three months when 
individuals arriving to and leaving the residence in vehicles 
13See also State v Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. Ct. App., 1989; 
State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. Ct. App., 1990; State v Rowe, 806 
P. 2d 730 (Ut.-'Ct. App., 1991. 
10 
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were transporting marijuana and paraphernalia and that 
individuals at the residence have marijuana and paraphernalia 
secreted on their persons [Affidavit, paragraph #5], and that the 
informant was aware that the subjects living in a trailer on the 
premises were parties to the subjects living in the residence 
[Affidavit, paragraph #6]. 
But, as noted above, the mere recital of multiple assertions 
does not necessarily indicate the informant is truthful or 
accurate in his claims. In fact, instead of indicating 
credibility in the informant, the number and nature of these 
claims should raise a red flag to any magistrate. 
Having had "hundreds of experiences with marijuana" this 
informant is very likely a felon (Section 58-37-8(2) (e) 
designates a third possession of marijuana to be a third degree 
felony). Has this informant's ability to perceive, remember, or 
relate facts been effected by drug use? From the informant's 
reports of hundreds of drug experiences as well as exposure to 
other's drug sales and use as well as incriminating admissions by 
the Defendant, it is obvious that this informant is, himself, 
deeply involved in the drug culture to the point that others are 
supposedly willing to commit criminal acts openly in his 
presence(one doesn't normally and repeatedly stumble into the 
types of situations described by this informant). This informant 
may have been "earning" a plea bargain or avoiding prosecution 
11 
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himself; if so, this added motivation should have been known by 
and considered by the magistrate. It is unlikely that a person as 
openly involved in criminal activity as this informant claims to 
be was providing information to the police out of a sense of 
civic mindedness. Because this informant is not of the class of 
informants for whom the magistrate might assume reliability and 
truthfulness14 some indicia of motivation should be included in 
the Affidavit. Yet, the Affidavit provides no reason for the 
informant's cooperation with the police. ~ .. 
Admittedly Gates directs that reviewing magistrates are not 
to take a hyper-critical approach to requests for search 
warrants. But, neither are magistrates expected to abandon all 
critical thought or common sense or neutrality when reviewing 
such requests. Where, as here, the total basis for the request 
for a search warrant originates in a confidential informant, the 
Utah appellate court have, on several occasions, recognized that "citizen" 
informants used in affidavits for search warrants can be presumed reliable. A 
review of these holdings indicates that there is no bright-line definition of 
"citizen" in this context. However, dicta from these cases is informative. 
Generally, a citizen informant is one who receives nothing in exchange for 
information, reveals his/her name or identity through the affiant to the 
magistrate or is a neighbor or a family member or in some other way is 
identifiable, has no criminal record that would suggest unreliability, 
participates in controlled buys, or whose information is strongly corroborated 
in all of its critical detail. The magistrate in this case did not have the 
benefit of any of this type of information in the Affidavit presented to him. 
See, for example State v Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah, 1983); State v Treadwav 499 
P.2d 846 (Utah, 1972); State v Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. Ct. App., 1987); State 
v Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Ut. Ct. App., 1989); State v Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. 
Ct. App., 1990); State v Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Ut. Ct. App., 1992); State v 
White, 851 P.2d 1195 (Ut. Ct. App., 1993); State v Blaha, 851 P.2d 1205 (Ut. Ct. 
App., 1993); State v Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah, 1984); State v Potter, supra; 
State v Viqh, supra; State v Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Ut. Ct. App., 1997). 
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magistrate should expect to be presented with specific 
articulated facts assuring him of the informant's credibility, 
basis of knowledge, and reliability free from ulterior 
motivation. And, where, as here, factual evidence of the 
informant's reliability is insufficient, the magistrate is not 
being hyper-critical by refusing to grant the warrant. Because 
the Affidavit in this case does not adequately support the 
reliability and credibility of the informant upon whom the 
information asserted rests, the warrant was improvidently issued 
and should be suppressed by this Court. 
2. The Affidavit did not provide evidence sufficient to justify a 
search without notice of intent or authority. 
Utah Code Section 77-23-210(2) allows a magistrate to 
authorize a no-knock entry "only upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given." The affiant lists five reasons why authority 
to execute the warrant without notice was sought: 1)certain 
persons lived in a trailer on the target property who might alert 
the occupants of the house to the officers1 presence, 2) two 
schools are situated directly across the street [Affidavit, 
paragraph #6] 3) the sought-after contraband might be destroyed, 
4) the suspected illegal activity occurred mostly'during evening 
hours, and, 5) in the affiant's experience persons involved with 
distribution of narcotics "often" have weapons and surveillance 
13 
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equipment [Affidavit, paragraph #7]. None of these five cited 
reasons justified no-knock authority. 
Besides stating that "subjects" live in a trailer next to 
the target residence and that they are "party" to the occupants 
of the house, the Affidavit does not explain how such "subjects" 
could or would give an alert that would be any different than an 
alert given by the searching officers' knocking and announcing 
their authority and purpose to search. Despite the informant's 
supposed extensive contact with the occupants of the target 
residence, the informant gives no detail about how those who were 
in the trailer were "party" to those in the house such as their 
identities, the extent of their observed conduct, anyone's 
statements, or even whether the people from the trailer had ever 
been seen in the house, etc. It is unclear what is meant by the 
label of "party" beyond mere casual acquaintance or possibly " 
tenant. It is thus unproved that the people from the trailer were 
motivated to alert the occupants of the house to an attempt to 
serve a warrant. It is also unclear, assuming the people from the 
trailer were inclined to interfere with the police's service of 
the warrant, how it is suspected they would do so. No information 
is given regarding the positioning of the trailer in respect to 
the anticipated approach of the officers to the house, lines of 
sight from the trailer, etc. Without these necessary facts the 
14 
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magistrate could only assume interference from the people in the 
trailer. 
Service of the warrant was achieved on 22 June, 2000. 
Nothing in the warrant indicated that school was in session on 
that date as opposed to being on Summer hiatus. Service at night 
was sought and authorized. Service was actually achieved at 9:00 
p.m., well after normal school hours or when children might be 
expected to be on the school grounds. Nothing about the timing of 
the search or the location of the schools justified entry without 
notice. In fact, as the facts indicate, there was a reasonable 
alternative to no-knock authority, i.e. simply to time execution 
of the warrant when children aren't expected to be present. 
If the informant is to be believed, the affiant expected to 
find growing marijuana plants in the residence as well as around 
the residence, in a shed near the house, and in a barn to the 
rear of the house. Neither the informant nor the affiant 
explained to the magistrate how this contraband could be "easily 
secreted, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise altered" as asserted 
in paragraph #7. It appears the affiant merely parroted the 
statutory language in the request for no-knock authority without 
detailing or explaining how the suspected contraband might be 
destroyed. 
While-the affiant asserts that "[t]he informant observed the 
illegal activity occurring mostly during the evening hours" in 
15 
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paragraph #7, the paragraphs setting forth the informant's 
specific observations [#3,#4,#5,#6] do not indicate the time of 
any alleged illegal activity. Additionally, it is hard to 
understand how the suspected growing of marijuana can occur 
"mostly in the evening hours". 
Lastly, the affiant's personal experience that other persons 
involved with narcotics "often" have weapons and surveillance 
equipment is an unscientific sampling that can't be taken as 
probative of the actions of all narcotics users, generally, or of 
this Defendant, specifically. Does "often" mean 2% or 98%; the 
magistrate can only guess from this statement. Moreover, such 
apocryphal information is irrelevant here as, if the informant is 
to be believed, even after his claimed extensive exposure in, to, 
and around the residence, its occupants, the people from the 
adjacent trailer, and many visitors, the informant makes ho 
mention of any weapons or surveillance equipment. In this 
counsel's experience, this is another example of "stock" language 
that often appears in search warrant affidavits filed in this 
District which appears to be used to justify searches and night 
time or no-knock authority when case specific facts don't 
otherwise exist. 
The Affidavit did not justify the searching officers to vary 
from the requirement that they give notice of their authority and 
purpose and wait to be admitted with reasonable promptness, 
16 
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spelled out in Section 77-23-210 (1). Accordingly, the evidence 
seized pursuant to service of this Search Warrant should be 
suppressed even if the Affidavit set forth probable cause to 
suspect contraband was on the premises. 
3. Defendant's incriminating statements and actions were not 
attenuated from the illegal search. 
From the police incident reports provided to Defendant it is 
anticipated that testimony would establish that Defendant made 
voluntary statements to certain police officers and also 
voluntarily pointed out the existence of contraband in the house 
after service of the Search Warrant. Should this Court determine 
that the Affidavit lacked probable cause or was wrongfully served 
without notice of authority and intent, evidence of Defendant's 
incriminating statements and actions should nevertheless be 
suppressed, even though voluntary, because they were not 
attenuated from the preceding police illegality. 
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal 
police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if. both 
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given 
voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality."15 As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Arroyo, this need for attenuation of consent 
from antecedent police illegality has its roots in the "fruit of 
15State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah, 1990); State v 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah, 1993). :'J 
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the poisonous tree doctrine" of Wong Sun v United States, 371 
U.S. (1963). Attenuation occurs only when circumstances 
remove any taint of the police illegality from the consent. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that the test for determining 
that a•consent has been sufficiently attenuated from a prior 
police illegality is 1) the purpose and flagrancy of the wrong, 
2) temporal proximity of the wrong and the consent, and 3) 
intervening factors.16 
In this case the first factor probably weighs in favor of 
the State as the police were neither blatant nor abusive in their 
wrongfulness. However, the*second two factors weigh for the 
Defendant because the Defendant's consent occurred while many 
police remained in his house, while Defendant was detained (if 
not in custody), moments after entry into his home, without the 
existence of intervening factors such as consultation with an 
attorney. Defendant's incriminating statements and actions were 
not removed from the taint of the illegal entry into his home. 
Consequently, the fruits of such statements and actions should be 
suppressed. 
Conclusions. 
The Affidavit seeking a Search Warrant in this case lacked 
probable cause because the sole confidential informant upon whom 
the Affidavit was primarily based was not proved believable. 
16Thurman, supra. 
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There was not evidence sufficient to justify no-knock entry into 
Defendant's residence. Defendant's incriminating statements and 
actions were fruit of the police illegality. All evidence derived 
as a direct or indirect result of the service of the subject 
Search Warrant should therefore be suppressed and ruled 
inadmissable at the trial of this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2001. 
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for 
Robert Barney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /p day of July, 2001, I 
hand-delivered or mailed with postage pre-paid a copy of the 
foregoing to the following: 
Carlyle K. Bryson 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
 fnr o m ^ p u r n o s e s Qf 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 ~.V.-.."Z- ^  r-,.
 T~- r r-> .n*i/**tnrn'-v T-
PROVO, UTAH r ^ a s e u ~y a r* ^cumy ntium^y k, 
PHONE: (801) 3 7 0 - 6 0 2 6 MiCHae? fcSPlSH 
OCT 1 S ZGGO 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ^ A\\W 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
-vs- : 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION : Criminal No 
1136 South State Road 198 
Payson, Utah 84651 : 
Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss . 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Comes now Robert Welcker, having been duly sworn, who deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a police officer for the city of American Fork, I have been a 
peace officer since 1994. That I am a graduate of the Utah Police 
Academy (POST) and have received specialized training for law 
enforcement work including training specific to narcotics work. 
I am currently assigned to the Utah County Major Crime Task I have 
been investigating narcotics since 1998. I am certified as a 
clandestine lab first responder.. I have work several hundred 
narcotic cases and I have worked with dozens of confidential 
informants. 
That within the past 72 hours your affiant has received information 
from a reliable confidential informant who has provided reliable 
information in the past. That this reliable confidential informant 
has supplied officers with the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force 
with information'-for the past year. That this informant has been 
responsible for the recovery of narcotics in several cases. That 
this information supplied by this informant has always been proven 
true through independent investigations by myself and other 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
detectives of the Major Crimes Task Force. That this informant has 
provided information which has proven to be reliable in the past. 
That this informant: has never provided information that has been < 
wrong or misleadir.c. That this informant is not party to this 
litigation. DISCOVERY SENT TO 
DEFEWSF ATTORMF* , 
That this reliable confidential informant told your affiant that °$ 
within the past 72 hours the informant was at the residence located *A 
at 1136 South State Road #198 Payson, Utah. That while at the < ^ V 
residence the informant did observe a substance known to the ^ 
informant as marijuana inside the residence. That the informant has 
had hundreds of experiences with marijuana and knows the substance 
well. That the marijuana was located in the residence and in a shed 
near the house. That the informant did tell your affiant that the 
owners of the residence, Robert Barney and Annette Petro are 
distributing marijuana from the residence. That within the past 72 
hours the informant did observe Robert Barney sell a quantity of 
approximately % ounce to an individual for approximately 120 
dollars. That Robert Barney did tell the informant that he is 
growing his own marijuana in and around the residence. That this 
informant knows Robert Barney and Annette Petro to live in the 
residence at 1136 South SR #198. 
c:-r riffHai Furocses Only _ 
K^ ; -a - i 3v The County Attorney To 
Sichaei Espiin __£CTJJjOQ{L-
That within the past 3 0 days the reliable confidential informant was 
inside the residence with Annette Petro and Robert Barney. That 
while in the house Robert Barney did tell your informant that he is 
growing marijuana in his house and in a barn to the rear of the 
house. That Robert Barney did tell your informant that he sells 
a lot of marijuana and that he usually gets $60.00 per 1/8 ounce 
sold. That your informant did observe marijuana in the residence and 
that it was very wet and fresh. That Robert Barney did attempt to 
sell a quantity of marijuana to the confidential informant. 
That this informant stated that the informant has been at the 
residence several times in the past three months when individuals 
arriving to and leaving the residence in vehicles were transporting 
marijuana and paraphernalia and that individuals at the residence 
have marijuana and paraphernalia secreted on their persons. That 
failure to search persons at and arriving to the residence during 
the execution of this warrant as well as vehicles associated with 
people present or%arriving to the address of 20 north 100 west #6 
American Fork, Utah will result in officers missing valuable 
evidence pertinent to this investigation. cp,Q riCCjf'iM pf IDDH^CQ pMj Y 
That the informant told your affiant that the subjects living in a 
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trailer next to the residence are party to the subjects living in 
the residence at 1136 south SR #198 . That if notice of intent is 
given that officers safety will be at risk due to the subjects 
living in the trailer next to the residence may alert the oersons 
living at 1136 south SR#193. That the residence is located across 
the street from Two separate schools located directly east of the 
residence located at 1136 south SR #198. That serving this warrant 
in the nighttime hours will afford a safer environment for children 
in the area attending these schools or frequenting the school 
playgrounds. Therefore your affiant respectfully request permission 
to serve this warrant during the nighttime hours and without; i^^e^trf ~fO 
or authority to allow a window of safety fe^^fC^^a^^ln^Slor7, ±j' 
chUdren in the area. ^CPPNfiF'^TTOffl^ 
That the amount of narcotics observed in the residence is an amount 
large enough for distribution but small enough to be easily 
secreted, destroyed, damaged or otherwise altered if notice of 
intent or authority is given. That the amount of narcotics observed 
can also be secreted, destroyed, damaged or otherwise altered if 
notice of intent or authority is given. That the informant observed 
the illegal activity occuring mostly during the evening hours. That 
it is your affiants experience that persons involved with the 
distribution of narcotics often have weapons and surveillance 
equipment to protect themselves from police and other persons 
selling drugs in competition with themselves. 
That this informant has provided information which has proven to be 
reliable in the past. That this informant has never provided 
information that has been wrong or misleading. That this informant 
is not party to this investigation. For Official Purposes Only 
Retaer-&d By The County Attorney To 
Michael tsplin
 n n T , , m 
Your affiant believes that failure to search the residence, 
outbuilding, curtilage, and persons and vehicles of individuals 
present and arriving to the residence of 113 6 south SR# 198 Payson, 
Utah will result in officers missing valuable evidence pertinent to 
this investigation. Your affiant expects to locate the following 
items, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cash, packaging 
material, scales, items used for the ingestion or cultivation of the 
above mentioned narcotics and other items associated with the 
use/distribution of controlled substances and related paraphernalia. 
FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES ONLY 
Released by the County Attorney tc 
UBLIC DEFENDER 
MAR 2-3:2(301 
The residence is more particularly described as single family 
dwelling facing to the east and is on the west side of State Road 
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#198. That the residence is grayish green in color and the outside 
of the house is made of a slat tile. The house is the second house 
south of 1070 south on the west side of SR #198. That there is a 
brown and creme trailer parked to the rear of the house near the 
south , west corner. The house number 1136 is displayed on the front 
porch on a awning support pole and the numbers are made of wood, 
white in color. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by this 
court authorizing a search of the residence, together with the curtilage, 
outbuildings, and persons and vehicles of individuals present and 
arriving to the residence of 113 61 South SR#198 Payson, Utah for the 
following items, narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, 
electronic equipment, cash, packaging material, scales, items used for 
the ingestion or the cultivation of the above mentioned narcotics and 
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances 
and related paraphernalia. 
Dated this 771£- day of June 2000 <0_.M. 
Subscribed and sworn before me on the 
June 2000, £ f ^ 7 /l.M. 
For Official Purposes Only 
Released By The County Attorney To 
Michael £spi5r OCT I 8 2000 . 
rUH U'rrfUihL run ; O W ^ J •**• •-
Q c - i m ^ hu tnp County Attorney T«c 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
10 0 EAST CENTER, SUITS 210 0 
PROVO, UTAH 84 601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
•-.: »/-, r-- i" rZ \Z K; n >- H 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
US-
SEARCH WARRANT 
ireNSEATTORMg 
m 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 
1136 South State Road 198 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Defendants 
Criminal No. 
prtf nfi\r\*\ PyrDOSSS or 
P^^sec^By The County Attorney To 
Michael Espiin OOTA1I0G0 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's 
Endorsement 
It has been established by oath or 
affirmation made or submitted to me this 
-TC?^ day of June 2000, that there is probable 
cause to believe the following: 
The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being 
used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense; 
or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The property described below is most probably located at 
the premises also set forth below. 
The person or entity in possession of the property is a 
party to the alleged illegal conduct. * 
That this warrant may be served without notice of prior 
intent or authority due to the fact that items sought 
may be easily secreted, disposed of, destroyed or 
otherwise altered if notice of intent or authority is 
given. That execution of this warrant without notice of 
intent or authority will afford officers a window of 
er n 
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safety while securing the residence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to search the 
residence as more particularly described as single family dwelling facing 
to the east and is on the west side of State Road #198. That the 
residence is grayish green in color and the outside of the house is made 
of a slat tile. The house is the second house south of 1070 south on the 
west side of SR #198. That there is a brown and creme trailer parked to 
the rear of the house near the south , west corner. The house number 1136 
is displayed on the front perch on a awning support pole and the numbers 
are made of wood, white in color. 
That you are also hereby directed to search the residence together with 
the curtilage, outbuildings, and persons and vehicles of individuals 
present and arriving to the residence of 1136 South SR #198 Payson, Utah 
for the following items, narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe 
sheets, electronic equipment, cash, packaging material, scales, items 
used for the ingestion and cultivation of the above mentioned narcotics 
and other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled 
substances and related paraphernalia. 
rQF\ OFFICIAI "'D^.^^C' '"vi 
, l^tw official Purposes Onlv 
' ^ C C i j 
r*.' • • - — »- V '^ it* iSp i : 
bounty Attorney To 
0f;7 1* 2000 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring the 
property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the same in 
your possession pending further order of this court. You are instructed 
to leave a receipt for the property with the person in whose possession 
the property is found or at the premises where the property was located. 
After execution of the warrant you shall promptly make a verified return 
of the warrant to me together with a written inventory of any property 
seized identifying the place where the property is being held. 
*{&*}_ THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED DURING THE NIGHT TIME 
HOURS. 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT NOTICE OF PRIOR INTENT 
OR AUTHORITY. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF 
ISSUANCE. 
DATED this £3S~^~- day of June .2.00 0, jP*&7 , 7? M 
5ISTRATE 
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